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I suggest that the idea that conversational implicatures express argu-
ment can be signifi cant for the notion of communicational responsibility. 
This underlying argument should be included in the reconstruction of 
conversational implicatures as a justifi cation for the belief formed by the 
hearer on the basis of indirect communication. What makes this argu-
ment specifi c is the fact that its only explicit element is the speaker’s ut-
terance taken as its initial premise. In order to reconstruct all the other 
elements, the hearer has to take into consideration factors such as the 
context and general knowledge of the shared language and the world. As 
the reconstruction of conversational implicatures in general, the recon-
struction of implicatures as arguments is only potential. It is proposed 
that we should consider conversational implicatures as reason-giving 
arguments in which the speaker (arguer) addresses a hearer who does 
not need to reply. In those cases, the speaker is not trying to convince the 
hearer to accept his position but is explicitly stating a reason in support 
of his intended message. I believe that this approach can strengthen the 
idea of the speaker’s communicational responsibility for an implicated 
message even in the case when he wants to distance himself from it.
Keywords: Conversational implicature, indirect communication, 
arguments, argumentation, communicational responsibility, justi-
fi cation, rationality.
1. Introduction1
Conversational implicatures are generally seen as a cancellable prag-
matic occurrence that can never convey a message with absolute cer-
tainty. Additionally, the burden of responsibility for a belief formed on 
the basis of an implicature is often put on the hearer. This consider-
1 The writing of this paper was supported by the Croatian Science Foundation 
under grant number IP-06-2016-2408.
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ation can often be found in works dealing with the possibility of indi-
rect testimony and indirect lying (labelled “misleading” or “deception”). 
In the literature linking pragmatic phenomena with argumenta-
tion, the leading approach consists in adding elements from pragmat-
ics—often speech act theory—to the theory of argumentation in order 
to present the process of argumentation as a specifi c use of language 
that occurs among speakers in a certain disputational context. The 
idea I wish to present in this paper is that treating implicatures as ar-
guments could help us question the aforementioned characterization of 
implicatures and portrait them as a more robust speech phenomenon, 
i.e., a phenomenon that is not guided by largely unpredictable private 
communicational inclinations but one that can be objectively evaluated 
on the basis of general rational and communicative principles. I will not 
look into how pragmatics can help the study of argumentation. I will 
go the other way around and try to show how insights from the study 
of arguments and argumentation can help us with the understanding 
of conversational implicatures, especially if we wish to explore their 
normative dimension.2
2. Conversational implicature
I will start by presenting some simple examples of conversational im-
plicatures, a term introduced by H. P. Grice (1989). I will not go into de-
tail about Grice’s theory and the kinds of implicatures he presents. For 
the readers who are already familiar with his classifi cation it is enough 
to say that I will focus on particularized conversational implicatures 
and that my interest in this particular kind stems from the fact that 
they are often characterized as the one least prone to systematization. I 
take that they are guided by rationality and conventionality in a larger 
degree than it is usually believed.
The fi rst example is the following:
 Ani: How much longer will you be?
 Ben: Mix yourself a drink.
This dialogue starts with Ani asking a question. The answer to the 
question should be known to the addressee, Ben, since it is directly 
related to him. She receives a response that can be interpreted as say-
ing that Ben needs more time to get ready. The question is how can 
2 This is not to say that the evaluation of conversational implicatures as 
phenomena that express arguments is not a valuable exploration of the limits of 
arguments. As Goddu writes: “[a]rguments, as I understand them, are expressed by 
a variety of sources. Most straightforwardly we have written or spoken texts that 
express arguments. I have no objection to saying that pictures, musical pieces, or 
even sculptures might express arguments. At the same time (…) pictures or musical 
pieces or sculptures will not themselves be arguments. In addition, while many 
texts that express arguments are themselves arguments, plenty are not, for any 
text with an implied conclusion is not itself an argument” (2003: 4). Conversational 
implicatures could fi t nicely in this picture.
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Ani carry out this interpretation and why is she justifi ed in doing so 
since on the level of what is said the conveyed message differs from the 
intended one. In order for the belief to be justifi ed the two components, 
namely what is said and what is meant have to be plausibly linked. 
In the interpretation of conversational implicatures there are two ele-
ments that carry a major practical and theoretical weight, namely, the 
context and the intention of the speaker. Conversational implicatures 
cannot exist in a vacuum, they need a specifi c context to be triggered. 
The same utterance will not give rise to an implicature in every con-
text. In our example the utterance “Mix yourself a drink” conveys the 
message “It will take some time for me to get ready” only because it is a 
reaction to the question “How much longer will you be?” asked presum-
ably in a context in which Ani and Ben are going somewhere together, 
let’s say on a date. Additionally, there seems to be a requirement for 
the idea that there is a communicational intention behind the utter-
ance that invites the hearer to infer a message that is different from 
what is said. This requirement is posed by the fact that we treat other 
people as rational if there is no evidence to the contrary.3
The notion of intention4 is the starting point for the reconstruction 
of conversational implicatures. More specifi cally, according to Grice, 
conversational implicatures are always (potentially) calculable. This 
calculation is not a psychological process that occurs while the hearer 
interprets the utterance, but is a post facto reconstruction (see Haugh 
2008) that competent speakers should be able to carry out according to 
the following scheme: 
[The speaker] has said that p; there is no reason to suppose that he is not 
observing the maxims, or at least the Cooperative Principle; he could not 
be doing this unless he thought that q; he knows (and knows that I know 
that he knows) that I can see that the supposition that he thinks that q is 
required; he has done nothing to stop me thinking that q; he intends me to 
think, or is at least willing to allow me to think, that q; and so he has impli-
cated that q (Grice 1989: 31).
3 Here the notion of intentional stance would be of help, at least considered in 
relation to the prediction of human behaviour: “[h]ere is how it works: fi rst you 
decide to treat the object whose behavior is to be predicted as a rational agent; then 
you fi gure out what beliefs that agent ought to have, given its place in the world 
and its purpose. Then you fi gure out what desires it ought to have, on the same 
considerations, and fi nally you predict that this rational agent will act to further 
its goals in the light of its beliefs. A little practical reasoning from the chosen set of 
beliefs and desires will in most instances yield a decision about what the agent ought 
to do; that is what you predict the agent will do” (Dennett 1989: 17).
The notion of “theory of mind”/“mindreading” is also unavoidable: “[t]hat humans 
are capable of mindreading is all too obvious. We attribute mental representations 
to one another all the time. We are often aware of what people around us think, and 
even of what they think we think. Such thoughts about the thoughts of others come 
to us quite naturally” (Mercier and Sperber 2017: 94).
4 Taken as the ascription of intentions to the utterer by the audience (see Sbisà 
2001).
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This calculation is used as evidence for the argumentative rationality 
associated with conversationl implicatures (see Sbisà 2006 and 2007).
Let’s see another example.
Ani: Are you ready for the movie?
Ben: I am tired.
Again, we have a dating context. Ani and Ben decided to go to the mov-
ies together but when the time came Ben said that he was tired. In 
this kind of situation, the natural thing to do for Ani is to interpret 
his utterance as cooperative and relevant, which is in accordance with 
what Grice calls the Cooperative Principle: “Make your conversational 
contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the 
accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are 
engaged.” (Grice 1989:26) Grice also individuates four maxims related 
to the Cooperative Principle—Quantity (make your contribution as in-
formative as it is required), Quality (try to make your contribution one 
that is true), Relation (be relevant) and Manner (be perspicuous) (Grice 
1989).
If Ani is a competent, and I will claim, a rational speaker, she will 
naturally be guided by the Cooperative Principle and the maxims and 
will be able to reconstruct the inferential process that let her to the in-
terpretation of the speaker’s message following the scheme mentioned 
above. The steps of her reasoning can be reconstructed as follows:
(1) I assume B is following the rule of relevance.
(2) His remark would not be relevant unless the fact that his fatigue 
is relevant to whether or not he is ready for the movie.
(3) I know that when people are tired they often do not wish to go to 
movie dates. 
(4) If Ben is tired he does not wish to go to the movies. 
(5) Ben probably assumes I will reason in this way, and has not said 
anything to stop me from doing so.
(6) I conclude that Ben intends to convey that he does not wish to go 
to the movies.
What I would like to do next is claim that somewhere inside this re-
construction lies an argument, or in other words, that conversational 
implicatures express arguments.5
3. Conversational implicatures and arguments
The connection between implicatures and arguments has been recog-
nized before. Macagno and Walton, coming from a dialectical frame-
work, claim that
(…) conversational implicatures represent implicit meaning triggered by 
the use of a sentence and (…) they can be considered interpretations of 
5 We could also say that conversational implicatures are arguments, but this 
formulation should not be taken in a rigid literal sense.
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the meaning of a word or a speech act. On this perspective, conversational 
implicatures are triggered by confl icts of dialogical and epistemic presump-
tions that are resolved by a process of best explanation, which in turn are 
based on argumentation schemes such as inference to the best explanation, 
practical reasoning, argument from sign, appeal to pity and analogy. De-
pending on the context, the presumptions on which the process of explana-
tion is based on vary, and therefore the conclusion of the implicit argument 
can be different. (2013: 223)
According to the authors, conversational implicatures are explanations 
for presumptive inconsistencies. We have seen in the two examples 
presented above that the hearer can be taken as starting her interpre-
tation by wondering why the speaker has said exactly what he did and 
not something else, perhaps more informative and direct. The authors 
argue that conversational implicatures “need to be analyzed as implicit 
arguments, involving a pattern of reasoning leading from a specifi c 
premise to a conclusion” (Macagno and Walton 2013: 211).
According to the systematization presented by the authors our sec-
ond example could be explained as an Argument from Cause. It is an 
instance of causal argumentation that links an event to its effects. The 
general scheme of argument from cause can be represented as follows:
“Major Premise: Generally, if A occurs, then B will (might) occur.
Minor Premise: In this case, A occurs (might occur).
Conclusion: Therefore in this case, B will (might) occur”
(Macagno and Walton 2013: 219).
In our second example, the speaker replies that he is tired instead of 
giving a direct negative answer to the question whether he is ready to 
see the movie. The goal of the utterance is not to inform the interlocu-
tor about his fatigue, but to lead her to draw a conclusion from cause to 
effect. Tiredness is presumed to be incompatible with going to the mov-
ies: if someone is tired, he needs to stay at home, and if someone stays 
at home, he cannot at the same time see a movie at the theater. This 
causal relationship is presented as an alternative: either A or B; not A; 
therefore B. (Macagno and Walton 2013: adapted from 219).
At this point it is necessary to take a step back and see what kind 
of arguments could conversational implicatures possibly be. Trying to 
answer this question Moldovan (2012) states the following:
[i]n order to avoid confusions it is relevant to point out that ‘argument’ is 
sometimes used to refer to a speech act of arguing, and sometimes used to 
refer to an abstract object, which is the content expressed by speech acts of 
arguing. (…) On the other hand, ‘implicature’, although sometimes used to 
refer to the content of an act of implicating something, it was introduced 
by Grice as a technical term to name the act of meaning that q by saying 
that p (…) To avoid confusion, the question under discussion here should 
be formulated as follows: is a conversational implicature always a speech 
act of arguing? And he concludes: “I think the answer to the above question 
should be negative. (2012: 304)
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If we are faced with the choice between a speech act of arguing and 
an abstract object we could be tempted to deny that implicatures are 
in any way related to arguments. They are indirect speech acts so they 
cannot be considered merely as abstract objects6 and since conversa-
tional implicatures are not characterized by a disagreement between 
the involved parties they cannot be considered as instances of the 
speech act of arguing. Consider again our examples. In both of them 
Ani asks a question to which Ben replies. He does not do so directly 
and Ani has to reach the intended message inferentially, but there is no 
disagreement that the parties need to solve. There is a communicative 
exchange aimed at the sharing of information. This sharing is achieved 
by the understanding of the implicature at play which can be repre-
sented as the reconstruction of an argument.
Luckily for us, the meaning of the words “argumentation” and “ar-
gument” are not exhausted by Moldovan’s two options. At this point 
we can turn to a distinction proposed by Hitchcock in a general discus-
sion about argumentation that will be useful in our current discussion 
about the connection between conversational implicatures and argu-
ments: “[i]n English, the word ‘argument’ and the corresponding verb 
‘argue’ are used in two quite clearly distinguishable senses.” (Hitchcock 
2017: 448). In the fi rst sense
arguing requires only one arguer (who in cases of collaboration in the pro-
duction of an argument can be a group of people). The arguer expresses a 
point of view on a question, and offers as support for this position one or 
more reasons. The expression of the point of view and the provision of one or 
more reasons in its support constitute a complex of speech acts. The arguer 
addresses these speech acts to one or more readers, listeners or observers, 
who need not reply. (Hitchcock 2017: 448)
As we can see, according to the fi rst sense arguments are produced 
by a speaker to put forward his point of view and the reasons he has 
to support it. The second sense presupposes two or more interlocutors 
sharing opinions.
The other sense is that in which we say such things as “they were argu-
ing with one another” or “they had a bitter argument” or “she argued with 
him”. In this sense, arguing requires at least two arguers; if one argues with 
oneself in this sense, then one sequentially takes two different roles. The 
arguers express to each other divergent opinions on some question. Each 
attempts to get the other(s) to accept their point of view, not necessarily by 
offering reasons in support of it. (Hitchcock 2017: 449)
As we can see from the above quotes, according to Hitchcock an argu-
ment can provide supporting reasons for one’s position or can be aimed 
at getting the other person to accept the arguer’s position. He labels 
the fi rst kind of argument the “reason-giving” sense and the second 
the “disputational” sense of “argument” and “argue”. The application of 
this distinction to conversational implicatures is fairly simple. I would 
6 For a discussion about the ontological status of arguments see for example 
Goddu 2010, Sinard-Smith and Moldovan 2011 and Patterson 2013.
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like to claim that conversational implicatures are reason-giving argu-
ments in which the speaker (arguer) addresses a hearer who does not 
need to reply. In the case of conversational implicature the speaker is 
not trying to convince the hearer to accept a position she disagrees with 
but is explicitly stating a reason in support of his intended message. 
As we have seen earlier explaining our second example as an Argu-
ment from Cause, if someone is tired he needs to stay at home, and if 
someone stays at home, he cannot at the same time see a movie. The 
explicit premise “I am tired” provides a reason for not going to the mov-
ies, that is, for the unstated conclusion. The general way of thinking of 
the form “if A occurs, then B will (might) occur” is the missing premise 
that links the explicitly given reason to the conclusion. Because of that 
we can reconstruct the argument on which the conversational implica-
ture is based. The utterance is one of the premises, more precisely it is 
the only explicit part of the argument since all additional premises, as 
well as the conclusion, are unstated.
4. Conversational implicatures and enthymemes
Now we have arrived to the most unintuitive part of the view of con-
versational implicatures as arguments, or more precisely, utterances 
expressing arguments, namely the fact that in this strange kind of ar-
gument only one premise is explicitly stated, while the conclusion and 
one or more additional premises are implicit. The idea is that conver-
sational implicatures can be considered a special case of enthymemes, 
that is, instances of arguments with unstated premises or conclusions. 
Enthymemes are reconstructed on the basis of their explicit elements 
using deductive, inductive or abductive forms of reasoning. These 
forms of reasoning differ in the level of strictness they possess. Induc-
tion is associated with statistical inference, deduction is not defeasible 
and abduction is characterized by plausible reasoning that can admit 
exceptions. The missing premises are generally taken to be assump-
tions that are needed to make the argument valid. The attribution of 
assumptions will often be justifi ed by appealing to the principle of char-
ity by which we should attempt to supply a missing statement that 
makes the argument valid or at least to choose the interpretation that 
makes the argument stronger. We have to keep in mind that the person 
we are attributing the conclusion to has never actually made that claim 
explicitly. Because of that we can say that enthymemes are not the 
same as the reconstructed arguments based on them. We can say that 
the reconstructed argument represents the original one. The same goes 
for conversational implicatures. The reconstructed argument is not the 
same as the utterance, but it can be a representation of it and of its 
underlying structure. The two are not the same, but are closely related. 
According to Gilbert (1991) incomplete arguments should be fi lled in 
with missing assumptions that are plausible to the intended audience 
or recipient of the argument and that appear to fi t in with the position 
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advocated by the arguer, as far as the evidence of the text indicates. 
If we apply this idea to conversational implicatures taken as reason-
giving arguments we could say that incomplete arguments should be 
fi lled in with missing assumptions that are plausible to the hearer and 
that appear to fi t in with the position advocated by the speaker, as far 
as the evidence of the context indicates.7
If we accept that communication sometimes requires from us the 
interpretation of indirect arguments, it could be asked what are the 
advantages of such communicative strategy? Is there any additional 
reason why speakers would choose incomplete forms of argumentative 
reason giving besides communicational economy if there is always a de-
gree of uncertainty that accompanies indirect communication? Jackson 
and Jacobs (1980) claim that enthymemes can be considered a special 
instance of Grice’s Quantity Maxim: be as informative as necessary, 
but avoid being more informative that is necessary. They claim: “En-
thymemes are not built the way they are for reasons of economy (i.e., 
merely to avoid the unnecessary); their method of construction opti-
mally exploits the rules of turn taking so as to respect the preference 
for agreement. Giving too much support for an assertion or proposal is 
not merely pointless, but positively detrimental. Giving more support 
than is necessary increases the number of places where disagreement 
may occur—and does so without improving prospects for agreement.” 
(264) Again, we should try to apply this idea to conversational impli-
catures as reason-giving arguments. If we accept that with the use of 
conversational implicatures the speaker provides to the hearer a rea-
son to accept an implicit conclusion on the basis of that reason, qua 
explicit premise, and other unstated premises we could explain the ap-
peal of conversational implicatures in the following way: in most cases 
the hearer will arrive, if she is cooperative and competent enough, to 
the intended message effortlessly and unconsciously. She will accept, 
or at least recognize as present, this unstated message that we have 
characterized as the conclusion of an argument. If she has reached this 
conclusion, we can assume that she has also individuated, or that she 
is capable to reconstruct, the inferential steps that lead to this con-
clusion, that is, that she can individuate the argument expressed by 
7 The arguments expressed by implicatures will always be characterized 
by a degree of uncertainty, but this is not specifi c for them: „[u]nlike verbal 
arithmetic, which uses words to pursue its own business according to its own rules, 
argumentation is not logical business borrowing verbal tools; it fi ts seamlessly 
in the fabric of ordinary verbal exchanges. In no way does it depart from usual 
expressive and interpretive linguistic practices. Statements with logical connectives 
(or other logical devices), and even sequences of such statements that more or less 
correspond to syllogisms, are just part of normal language use. They are used by 
speakers to convey a meaning that cannot be just decoded but that is intended to 
be pragmatically interpreted. Not only the words used but also the force with which 
premises and conclusions are being put forward are open to interpretation. They 
maybe intended as categorical or as tentative assertions, hedged by an implicit “in 
normal conditions.” (Mercier and Sperber 2017: 163, 164).
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the utterance. Since she has drawn the conclusion herself she cannot 
refute the whole inferential process directly. If she tried to refute the 
unstated conclusion the speaker could (truly!) say that he never said 
that. She could try to refute the stated premise but doing so in isolation 
from the whole argument would yield strange results—looking back at 
our examples, could Ani really say things like “You are not tired” or “I 
can’t mix myself a drink” without Ben being confused?
It could be claimed that this picture puts a heavy burden on the 
hearer, leaving to the speaker the opportunity to distance himself from 
the indirect message, that is, to cancel the implicature. The idea that 
the hearer is somehow responsible, or even guilty for the believes he 
forms on the basis of indirect messages, is not uncommon in epistemol-
ogy and ethics8. Still, I believe that this interpretation is erred. The 
view of conversational implicatures as argument gives more support 
to the hearer to justify her believes formed through indirect commu-
nication than it gives room to the speaker to cancel his message. Let’s 
return once again to our examples.
 Ani: Are you ready for the movie?
 Ben: I am tired.
According to the standard interpretation, Ben is too tired to go to the 
movies and this is the message that he wishes to convey to Ani. She will 
reach the intended message taking into account Ben’s cooperativeness, 
his communicative intention and the balance between the relevance 
of what is said and what could have been implicated. Still, this is not 
the only option. We can imagine a situation in which Ben wants to go 
to the movies and in which his comment about his tiredness is just a 
passing remark that carries no additional communicative weight. In 
this situation, the reasoning could be the following: he never said that 
he does not want to see the movie and Ani inferred that the movie date 
is cancelled on her own. She could easily have stopped at the level of 
what is said. We can also imagine that this interpretation could be used 
by Ben in a fi ght between him and Ani a couple of days after the date 
should’ve taken place. On that occasion, Ani could complain that they 
never go anywhere, mentioning the cancelled movie date as a recent 
example and Ben could claim that he never said that he did not want to 
go to the movies. This could be true, which opens up two possibilities: 
it could all be a misunderstanding or Ben could have been manipula-
8 For example, in the domain of testimony, Fricker writes: “[t]hese acts all 
share with paradigm tellings the successful getting across of a message. I shall 
not investigate here the respects in which they differ; except to say that where 
what is conveyed is not explicitly asserted there is, I believe, a diminution in the 
responsibility for the truth of what is got across incurred by the utterer” (2006: 246–
7). Writing about misleading (what we could call intended false implicatures) Adler 
notes: “[d]epending on the nature of the deception, the victim feels anything from 
foolish or tricked to corroded. Not only has he been misled, but the embarassment or 
horror of it is that he has been duped into collaborating on his own harm. Afterward, 
he cannot secure the relief of wholly locating blame externally” (1997: 442).
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tive. Even if it is undeniably true that Ben did not actually say that he 
does not want to go to the cinema I would claim that Ani was correct in 
reaching this interpretation.
To sum up, there are, I suggest, three interpretative possibilities in 
this case. Ben either wanted to implicate that he does not want to go to 
the movies, to mislead Ani into thinking that, or he made a communica-
tional mistake. In each scenario, the responsibility for the belief that he 
does not want to go to the movies formed by Ani on the basis on Ben’s 
utterance can be justifi ed taking into account the context of the utter-
ance, the relevance of Ben’s answer and the general communicational 
practice in which stopping at the level of what is said would be consid-
ered weird, uncooperative and even irrational. Think for example of 
the request “Can you pass the salt?” Stopping the interpretation of this 
utterance on the level of what is said and answering with “Yes, I can” 
without actually passing the salt to the utterer would be in most cases 
considered as a silly joke. The general idea is that competent language 
users should take conversational implicatures into consideration while 
communicating with other people; they should be aware that speakers 
could use them and that speakers could seek for indirect messages in 
what they said. If the context is known to both parties, in most cases, 
the interpretation should yield a true belief. Not only that, if the con-
text is known to third parties they should also agree, at least to a cer-
tain degree, to one specifi c interpretation. This makes it possible for 
the reader to understand the examples presented in this paper, as well 
as in all other papers concerned with indirect communication. That 
is because the intention of the speaker is not important per se. What 
is important is the possibility to reasonably attribute an intention to 
the speaker and then build on it by relying on the best theoretical and 
normative considerations.
The possibility of the reconstruction of an implicature as an argu-
ment makes the justifi cation of Ani’s belief even more openly a process 
that is not private and unconceivable by anyone other than the person 
who formed the belief in question. In a particular context, for reasons 
of communicational relevance, the utterance of the speaker should be 
taken as a premise on the basis of which the hearer (and all other in-
terested parties) could reconstruct an argument whose conclusion is 
the intended message. As we have seen it could be suggested that by 
adding the missing premises and accepting the conclusion of this im-
plicit argument the hearer is somehow responsible for accepting the 
conclusion. Still, I suggest that accepting the implicated conclusion is 
the only cooperative and rational thing to do in a situation in which the 
hearer can rationally presuppose that the intention of the speaker is to 
send a message that is different from the uttered one. This presupposi-
tion is made plausible by the application of the notion to instrumental 
rationality to indirect speech. The guiding question is how to make 
sense of the utterance. If the direct reading does not satisfy the require-
ment of relevance, that is, it is not informative enough for the current 
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communicational exchange, under the presumption that the speaker is 
instrumentally rational we should look for a reasonable explanation of 
his behavior. I suggest that a reasonable explanation could be the idea 
that he intended to communicate something else—this makes indirect 
communication an instrumentally rational means to achieve a certain 
communicative goal. To fi nd out what he wants to communicate we 
have to start from the presupposed intention and reach a conclusion by 
fi lling in the gaps, that is, providing the missing premises of the argu-
ment expressed by the implicature.
5. Conversational implicatures 
as inferences or explanations
One thing we need to look into is the possible objection that we should 
consider conversational implicatures as merely inferences or explana-
tions. I would like to maintain the position that there is more to them 
and that it is best to consider them as pragmatic phenomena that ex-
press arguments.
Allan (2001) compares the inferencential process related to con-
versational implicature to the case in which someone concludes that 
the person on the other side of a telephone line is female because the 
speaker has a high-pitched voice. This inference could be incorrect 
and, as claimed by the author, so could those related to implicatures. 
The way implicatures generate belief and knowledge is probabilistic 
even if it is based on deductive reconstruction, but there is a difference 
between the inference present in the phone case and that related to 
the understanding of conversational implicatures that can bring them 
closer to arguments. As we have seen, conversational implicatures are 
a conversational endeavor just like the act of argumentation. On the 
other hand, the inference made on the basis of a high-pitched voice 
on the other side of the telephone is private, it is not meant to share 
information or create a belief in another person. Also, there is no prem-
ise in the phone case, at least not a verbal one. In a conversational 
implicature there is one explicit premise, which is the utterance in-
tentionally addressed to the hearer. This is a direct invitation to reach 
the intended message, that is, the conclusion of the argument that can 
be reconstructed. I believe that this kind of communicative invitation 
marks a clear difference between conversational implicatures and in-
ferences like the one present in the phone call example.
Talking about the difference between arguments and inferences, 
Mercier and Sperber write the following:
[a]n inference is a process the output of which is a representation. An argu-
ment is a complex representation. Both an inference and an argument have 
what can be called a conclusion, but in the case of an inference, the conclu-
sion is the output of the inference; in the case of an argument, the conclu-
sion is a part—typically the last part—of the representation. The output 
of an inference can be called a “conclusion” because what characterizes an 
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inferential process is that its output is justifi ed by its input; the way how-
ever in which the input justifi es the output is not represented in the output 
of an intuitive inference.
What makes the conclusion of an argument a “conclusion” (rather than sim-
ply a proposition) is that the reasons for drawing this conclusion on the 
basis of the premises are (at least partially) spelled out (2011: 58).
As I wrote before, my suggestion is that the utterance that triggers the 
implicature can be seen as the only explicit premise in the argument 
that can be reconstructed on its basis. This premise carries the reason 
to accept a certain conclusion in a certain context. It is an invitation to 
make an inference and a commitment of the speaker to the relevance 
of what is said. Seeing the connection between an utterance and its 
conversational implicature as the link between a premise and a conclu-
sion is in contrast with the stance that in the case of conversational 
implicature the speaker wants to convey a message only loosely related 
to what is said. 9
To sum up, we can say that the difference between the reconstruc-
tion of implicatures and any other kind of reconstruction related to 
inferences is the following: the reconstruction of implicatures starts 
from an explicit premise—from “what is said”—and relies thus, at least 
partially, on other people, their input, their intentions, the common 
ground etc. In this context, “what is said” is an invitation for the hearer 
to draw an inference. This makes the creation and interpretation of im-
plicatures an intrinsically communal endeavor. On the other hand, in-
ferences can be private and often there is no linguistically coded input.
Now we can take a look at the relation between conversational im-
plicatures and explanations. Discussing the relation between argu-
ments and explanation Govier writes the following: „[a] fundamental 
difference between arguments and explanation is that in arguments, 
premises are intended to provide reasons to justify a conclusion where-
as, by contrast, in explanations claims are put forward to show how a 
phenomenon came to be. In an explanation, someone tries to explain 
why some claim is true, whereas in an argument a person tries to dem-
onstrate that it should be accepted” (2014: 14).
If we apply this reasoning to conversational implicatures seen as 
arguments, we can say that in an implicature the premises (stated and 
unstated) are reasons to accept the conclusion. The existence of an im-
9 When Bach writes about the difference between conversational implicature and 
impliciture he notes the following: “Impliciture is to be distinguished from Grice’s 
(1967a) conversational implicature. In implicature one says and communicates one 
thing and thereby communicates something else in addition. Impliciture, however, is 
a matter of saying something but communicating something else instead, something 
closely related to what is said.” (1994: 126). This formulation can be considered 
misleading and it certainly goes against the intuitions presented in this paper. If 
conversational implicature is not closely related to what is said how can we ever 
reach the intended message? Seeing this connection as the link between a premise 
and a conclusion could be one way to explain the relation between what is said and 
what is implicated.
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plicature can be explained by reconstructing the argument beneath it, 
but this will include additional elements, such as a general theoretical 
notion of implicatures themselves. We could say that the argument that 
can be expressed by a conversational implicature can be part of the ex-
planation of the existence of the implicature, but the explanation will 
have to include nations such as context, intention, relevance and so on.
I conclude by pointing out the usefulness of an approach that treats 
conversational implicatures as speech phenomena that can be said to 
express arguments, or that can be reconstructed as arguments. The 
general idea is that if the use and interpretation of conversational im-
plicatures are guided by argumentative reasoning this phenomenon 
can have a normative aspect: we could ask if there is a right way to in-
terpret them or if we can talk about communicational responsibility for 
what is implicated. I would like to propose a normative view of the use 
and interpretation of conversational implicatures that can be applied 
in epistemology and ethics. Communicational responsibility10 for what 
is said can be supported by the view of implicatures as arguments since 
if the speaker is presenting a premise to the hearer he is inviting her to 
reach a conclusion. If the hearer is competent and rational she will do 
so. The burden of proof in case the speaker wants to distance himself 
from the conclusion lies on him and not on the hearer.11 He has to prove 
that the hearer has reasoned wrongly. In this paper, I wanted to argue 
for the idea that it will be more diffi cult to do so if we consider conversa-
tional implicatures as speech phenomena expressing arguments. The 
underlying argument gives strength to the conversational implicature 
and to the belief formed by the hearer on its basis.
I have used different formulations to describe the relation between 
arguments and conversational implicatures: in a loose sense it could be 
said that they are argument, we can say that they can be reconstructed 
as arguments, and we can talk about conversational implicatures ex-
pressing arguments. The best wording could perhaps be found by ask-
10 The notion of “communicational responsibility” could be linked to the notion of 
“epistemic culpability”, a term from social epistemology which describes a “failure to 
respond to evidence in the appropriate way” (see for example Begby 2013). The notion 
of “epistemic culpability” is present primarily in the discussion about epistemic 
injustice and prejudice and is primarily linked to the “hearer”. I use the notion of 
“communicational responsibility” primarily in relation to indirect communication, 
but it could be considered in a much broader sense as the commitment of a competent 
language user to the belief his interlocutor forms on the basis of his or her words, 
assuming that the hearer is also a competent language user in the sense that he 
or she respects general linguistic, interpretative and rational standard during the 
belief forming process.
11 Of course, there could be cases in which the speaker ha san implicature in 
mind but the hearer does not reach the intended conclusion or rejects the conclusion 
and takes into consideration only what is conveyed directly. In such cases, we 
should consider the hearer as not competent enough or as not cooperative. The 
argumentative view of implicatures could be also used in these cases to give strength 
to the implicated message.
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ing who produces the argument—is it created by the speaker or by the 
hearer? I believe that it is best to associate the argumentative aspect 
of conversational implicatures with their reconstruction and to make 
it part of the justifi cation of a hearer’s belief. Nevertheless, the fi rst 
input (the explicit premise) in the argument has to be provided by the 
speaker in the form of an utterance. As the reconstruction of conver-
sational implicatures in general, the reconstruction of implictures as 
arguments is only potential. It does not have to be actually carried out 
while interpreting and understanding an utterance but it is important 
that competent and rational language users could provide such recon-
struction. Even if only potential, this reconstruction is crucial since it 
creates the argument that justifi es the belief held by the hearer. The 
reconstruction and the argument can be presented to the speaker as a 
justifi cation of the belief held by the speaker and as proof of his com-
municative responsibility.
6. Conclusion
This paper should be considered as one of the fi rst steps towards a more 
comprehensive theory of communicative responsibility. Such theory is 
needed since it is often claimed that the hearer is, at least partially, re-
sponsible for a belief she formed on the basis of implicated content she 
attributed to the speaker even if this attribution is justifi able. 
I want to suggest that if a rational and competent hearer formed her 
belief taking into account all the factors needed for the understanding 
of a conversational implicature, she should be considered a cooperative 
and competent language user. Even in the case the belief she formed 
turned out to be false due to malicious intentions on part of the speaker 
or because of a misunderstanding, it is wrong to consider her even par-
tially responsible for holding false beliefs since forming the belief in 
question was, from a communicative, and subsequently an epistemic 
and moral point of view, the right thing to do in that particular context. 
I believe that this position could be reinforced by considering conversa-
tional implicatures as speech phenomena that express arguments. In 
this way we do not use pragmatics to explain and advance our knowl-
edge of argumentation but vice versa, we use argumentation to give 
strength to indirect communication.
The idea that conversational implicatures express arguments could 
be unintuitive, after all, meaning q with p could be just that, an infer-
ence from what is said to what is implicated. Still, I would like to claim 
that conversational implicatures are not merely inferences or explana-
tions, as could also be suggested. This is due to the fact that a com-
petent language user should always be capable of reconstructing the 
process that led him to conclude q from p. This reconstruction will have 
the form of an argument in which there is only one stated premise. On 
the basis of that premise and a reasonable attribution of intention to 
the speaker the hearer will fi ll in the gaps of the argument in question 
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relying on the context, general knowledge of the used language and 
other relevant factors.
We can consider conversational implicatures as reason-giving argu-
ments in which the speaker (arguer) addresses a hearer who does not 
need to reply. In those cases, the speaker is not trying to convince the 
hearer to accept his position, as in the case of disputational arguments, 
but is explicitly stating a reason in support of his intended message.
By grasping the intended message, the hearer intuitively accepts 
the reasons provided for it and can also reconstruct the argumentative 
path that lead from an explicit reason, qua premise, to the intended 
conclusion. This could be interpreted as a justifi cation for the view that 
the hearer is responsible for the belief she formed on the basis of con-
versational implicature, but I would like to claim that it actually justi-
fi es the idea that forming her belief as she did was the only cooperative 
and rational thing to do.
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